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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of an Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment entered by Judge J. Philip Eves of the Fifth 
District Court. (R.218-19). This Court has jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment in 
favor of Appellees on the basis that Appellant failed to establish 
that she met any of the threshold criteria enumerated in Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-22-309(l)? 
2. Should this Court determine issues raised for the first 
time by Appellant on appeal, and has Appellant properly preserved 
these issues for appeal? 
In reviewing cases disposed of by summary judgment the 
reviewing court determines whether or not there are genuine issues of 
material fact that preclude summary judgment and the correctness of 
the application of controlling law. Ferree V, State, 784 P.2d 149, 
151 (Utah 1989); Themy v. Seagull Enter,r Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 
1979) . 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Interpretation of the following statutes is determinative 
of this appeal: Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(1) (1953 as amended); 
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 (1953 as amended). 
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STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises from alleged personal injury sustained by 
Appellant in an automobile accident which allegedly occurred on 
January 2, 1990 in Parowan, Iron County, Utah. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Appellees made a Motion for Summary Judgment which was 
granted on April 14, 1994 by Judge J. Philip Eves of the Fifth 
District Court prior to trial. (R. 218-19). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court granted Appellees1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
D. Statement of Facts 
The following Statement of Facts is taken in large part 
from the Statement of Material Facts contained in Appellees1 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (R.166-68). 
1. On or about January 3, 1992, Appellant served a Summons and 
Complaint upon Appellees alleging personal injuries resulting from an 
automobile accident which occurred on January 2, 1990 in Parowan, 
Utah. (R.l-11) . 
2. This case was originally scheduled for a four-day jury 
trial on December 7, 1993. Due to inability to seat an impartial 
-2-
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jury, a mistrial was declared and the case was rescheduled for trial 
on April 12, 1994. (£££ R.71, 157). 
3. Following the mistrial, and pursuant to stipulation of' 
counsel for all parties, the deposition of the Appellant's treating 
physician, D. Ross McNaught, M.D., was taken on January 21, 1994. 
(£££ R.160-63). 
4. In his deposition, Dr. McNaught testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. I want to make sure I understand, Doctor. 
Have you rendered a disability rating as a 
result of her automobile accident? 
A. No. Only an impairment rating. 
Q. Are you prepared to render a disability rating 
as a result of her accident? 
A. No. That is not my job. 
Q. You wouldn't be able to testify about a 
disability rating in any way, shape or form? 
A. It's not a medical decision, sir. 
Q. So I take it the answer is you wouldn't be able 
to? 
A. No. 
• • • 
Q. Okay. Have you, at any time, undertaken any 
evaluation of Miss Carter's work requirements or 
work-related activities for purposes of 
establishing whether she can or cannot perform 
them? 
A. As far as what she has is training for now? 
Q. Or what she's done in the past. 
A. I'm not sure I understand the question. 
Q. Well, I'm really getting at this concept of 
disability. Have you done any sort of study of 
what her work requirements are or what she's 
required to do or what she will be required to 
do if she becomes a counselor? 
A. No, I haven't. 
(R.175-78). 
5. On March 3, 1994, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the basis that Appellant had failed to establish that she 
-3-
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met any of the threshold criteria for maintaining a suit for general 
damages contained at Utah Code Ann. S31A-22-3Q9(1). (R.164-65). 
6. In her Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellant admitted that 
"the only plausible basis for her having met the threshold under 
Section 31A-22-309(1) of the Utah Code is a permanent disability." 
(R.189). 
7. On April 4, 1994, Judge J. Philip Eves of the Fifth 
District Court held a hearing on Appellees1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Following the hearing Judge Eves entered a Minute Entry 
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment and stating, "There is no 
evidence of permanent disability." (R.207). 
8. On April 13, 1994, Judge Eves signed an Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In the Order Judge Eves 
found as follows: 
1. Plaintiff admits that the only way she can meet 
the elements required for maintaining a cause of 
action set forth in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(1) is 
through establishing that she has sustained 
"permanent disability." 
2. Plaintiff has failed to set forth evidence from 
any competent expert witness establishing that she 
has been rendered unable to work in any capacity as 
a result of the automobile accident at issue in this 
case. Plaintiff has therefore failed to present ' 
evidence sufficient under Rule 5 6 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure to establish that she has 
sustained "permanent disability" as set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(1). 
-4-
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Consistent with the foregoing, the Court hereby 
ORDERS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
is hereby granted. 
(R.218-19). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In her Brief (hereinafter "Br. at _ _ _ " ) Appellant makes 
repeated reference to portions of depositions never made part of the 
record on appeal, and not presented to and/or considered by the trial 
court in granting summary judgment. Such references are made in 
contravention of Rules 11(e) and 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, 
Appellant argues that an amendment to Utah Code Ann. S31A-22-
309(1) which adds "permanent impairment based upon objective 
findings" as a criterion for meeting the threshold requirements for 
maintaining a lawsuit for general damages, although not in effect at 
the time of the accident at issue or at the time the trial court 
granted Appellees1 Motion for Summary Judgment, should be 
retroactively applied. (Br. at 5-9). This argument was not raised 
at any time in the trial court, and is thus precluded from 
consideration on appeal. 
Even if Appellant had properly raised her argument that the 
subsequent amendment to the threshold statute should be retroactively 
applied in the trial court, the amendment to the statute cannot be 
applied retroactively pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3, and does 
-5-
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not meet any of the criteria and/or requirements for retroactive 
application established by Utah case law. 
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in granting 
Appellees1 Motion for Summary Judgment because Appellant raised a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether she has suffered 
"permanent disability" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
309(1). (See Br. at 9-14). A review of the record on appeal 
establishes that the trial court properly found that Appellant failed 
to present any competent evidence of "permanent disability" 
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment should, therefore, be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT A SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT TO 
§31A-22-309(l) TO INCLUDE "PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT BASED ON 
OBJECTIVE FINDINGS" AS A THRESHOLD CRITERION SHOULD 
BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED IS PRECLUDED BECAUSE 
IT WAS NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
It is axiomatic that matters and arguments not presented to the 
trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See e.g. 
Progressive Acquisition. Inc. v. Lytle, 806 p.2d 239, 242 (Utah App. 
1991); Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036, 
1039 (Utah App. 1991). Preclusion of appellate court consideration 
of arguments raised for the first time on appeal has been held by 
this Court to apply in a situation where retroactive application of a 
-6-
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statute was first raised and argued on appeal. In State v. Smithr 
812 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991), this Court was asked to retroactively 
apply an amendment to a state statute establishing a thirty-day time 
requirement on motions to withdraw guilty pleas. This Court/ noting 
that the argument of untimeliness of the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea under the amended statute had not been raised in the 
trial court/ stated as follows: 
We do not reach the issue of whether amended Section 77-
13-6 applies retroactively, because even if it does so 
apply/ the State's untimeliness argument was not raised 
in the trial court, and was therefore not preserved for 
appeal. 
Id. at 475-76. 
Because Appellant in the present case did not raise the issue of 
retroactivity of the amendment to the threshold statute in the trial 
court, thus precluding trial court consideration of the argument/ 
Appellant is precluded from raising the issue in this Court for the 
first time on appeal. 
II. 
THE SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT TO §31A-22-309(1)(c)/ 
ADDING "PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT BASED ON OBJECTIVE 
FINDINGS" AS A THRESHOLD CRITERION DOES NOT 
APPLY RETROACTIVELY. 
Even if Appellant has properly raised her argument that the 
amendment to Section 31A-22-309(1)(c) adding "permanent impairment 
based on objective findings" as a threshold criterion for maintaining 
a suit for general damages should be applied retroactively, Utah law 
-7-
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precludes retroactive application of the amendment. The accident at 
issue in this case occurred on January 2, 1990, and the trial court's 
order granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on 
April 13, 1994. (R.2; 218-19). The amendment to Section 31A-22-
309(1) adding "permanent impairment based upon objective findings" as 
a threshold criterion did not become law until May 2, 1994. (See 
Amendment Notes contained in Appendix A). Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 
provides, "No part of these revised statutes is retroactive unless 
expressly so declared." The amendment which Appellant seeks to have 
this Court apply retroactively contains no such expressed declaration 
of retroactive application. 
Utah courts have recognized a narrow exception to the rule that 
statutory amendments do not apply retroactively absent express 
declaration in situations where the amendments are merely procedural, 
£££ e,g. State V, Burgess, 870 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 1994) . Procedural 
statutes which may be applied retroactively are defined as those 
which do not "enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested rights." Smith 
v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990). As this Court stated in Q£X 
Industries v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 
1993) : 
As a general rule, a party is entitled to have its 
rights determined on the basis of the law as it 
existed at the time of the occurrence, and the later 
statute or amendment should not be applied retro-
actively so as to deprive a party of its rights or 
impose greater liability upon it. 
Id. at 383. 
-8-
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This Court has held that where an amendment to a statute limits 
the time a person can be placed on probation, thereby enlarging the 
rights of an individual who is placed on probation, the amendment is 
to be considered substantive, and cannot be applied retroactively. 
See Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d at 792. In the present case, the 
amendment to the threshold statute which Appellant seeks to apply 
retroactively establishes a new category of individuals who may 
maintain an action for general damages, i.e. those having sustained 
permanent impairment based upon objective findings. As such, the 
amendment, if retroactively applied in this case, would impose 
greater liability upon Appellees, and thus is to be considered a 
substantive statute which cannot be applied retroactively. 
III. 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLEES WERE ENTITLED 
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
SHE HAD BEEN PERMANENTLY DISABLED. 
Appellant argues that even assuming the recent amendment to 
Section 31A-22-309(1) does not apply retroactively, she has still 
presented evidence establishing that she has met the "permanent 
disability" threshold requirement. (See Br. at 10-14). The only 
"evidence" which Appellant has presented to this Court consists of 
references in her "Statement of Facts" (Br. at 3-5) to portions of 
depositions which were never made part of the record in the trial 
-9-
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court, and were, therefore, never considered by the trial court 
prior to the time it granted Appellees1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
As this Court noted in Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utahr 794 
P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1990), the Appellant has the burden of 
providing the Court of Appeals with an adequate record to preserve 
its arguments for review. (See also Rules 11(e) (2) and 24(a) (7) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.) In the present case, 
Appellant failed to order a transcript of oral argument on 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment and also failed to make part 
of the record portions of depositions not provided to the trial 
court, and cited for the first time in Appellant's Brief. Absent 
evidence that the information cited for the first time on appeal was 
presented to the trial court, this Court will assume that the trial 
court's judgment was supported by sufficient evidence. (See Hortonf 
794 P.2d at 849.) 
Even if Appellant had properly provided the trial court with 
evidence referred to for the first time in her Appeal Brief, the 
evidence in the record clearly establishes that Appellant failed to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of 
permanent disability, in Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 
592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the 
meaning of "disability" as referenced in the No-fault Insurance Act. 
The Court stated: 
The benefits contemplated by the Act are phrased in 
terms of "disability" not in terms of "physical 
-10-
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impairment." The former is generally understood to 
mean the inability to work, whereas the latter refers 
to the loss of bodily function. 
592 P.2d at 611. 
Under the analysis of the Supreme Court in Jones, Appellant, in 
order to meet the requirements of the tort threshold relative to 
permanent disability, would have had to establish not only that she 
had been rendered unable to work, but that the condition of 
inability to work was "permanent." Such determinations require 
expert testimony, and are not, as Appellant suggests, capable of 
being established through "self-serving" testimony of the Plaintiff. 
(See Br. at 13). For example, in Morey v. Harper, 541 So.2d 1285 
(Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1989) the District Court of Appeals of Florida, 
First District, interpreting that State's threshold criterion of 
"permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, 
other than scarring or disfigurement", held that whether a plaintiff 
had suffered "permanent injury" was a determination which could only 
be satisfied through presentation of expert medical testimony. The 
Court stated: 
Therefore, even though the phrase 'permanent injury' 
is not a word of art in the medical profession, 
nevertheless the determination of what constitutes a 
permanent injury must, as a practical matter, be left 
to physicians trained in that profession. Hence, the 
language requiring proof of a permanent injury based 
on a reasonable degree of medical probability has 
established a requirement that can only be satisfied 
by expert medical testimony. 
Id. at 1288. 
-11-
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Likewise, in the present case, whether Appellant suffered 1) 
disability which was 2) permanent can be established only through 
presentation of expert testimony. No such testimony was presented 
to the trial court. Dr. McNaught's deposition testimony, which 
constituted the only competent expert testimony submitted to the 
trial court with respect to Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
clearly establishes that Dr. McNaught was not prepared to render any 
opinion as to Appellant's alleged "permanent disability" at trial. 
(See R. 174-78.) The trial court therefore correctly determined 
that Appellant failed to set forth evidence from any competent 
witness establishing that she has been rendered unable to work in 
any capacity as a result of the automobile accident at issue in this 
case. In sum, Appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact as to her allegation that she was "permanently disabled", and 
the trial court therefore properly granted Appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellees respectfully request 
that this Court affirm the decision of the District Court granting 
summary judgment in their favor. 
-12-
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Respectfully submitted this S,S^ day of /sCToh&f , 1994 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
By: 
DAVID W.\ LU 
Attorney for 
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31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to 
personal injury protection. 
(1) A person who has oris required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been 
caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one 
or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objec-
tive findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: j 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another ; 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured j 
154 
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES 31A-22-309 
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the 
policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
• * iiyury: 
(A) by intentionally causing iiyury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition 
incident to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any iiyury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials, 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any iiyured person under Section 31A-22-307 are 
reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation 
or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on 
; active duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person iiyured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by 
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as 
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue 
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any 
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by 
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof 
is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses 
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 Vfe% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract 
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is 
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
\ (6) Every policy providing personal iiyury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another 
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
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the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1963, 31A-22-309, enacted by 
L. 1986, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, i 160; 
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, 
S 8; 1992, ch. 230, 9 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, made minor 
stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote 
Subsection (2XaXi), which read: "for any inju-
ries sustained by the injured while occupying 
another motor vehicle owned by the insured 
and not insured under the policy." 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, inserted "or is required to have* near the 
beginning of Subsection (1). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
added "or permanent impairment based upon 
objective findings" to the end of Subsection 
(IXc); made a stylistic change in Subsection 
(3Xb); and added letter designations in Subsec-
tion (5). 
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